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Abstract
We present experimental results on individual decisions in juries. We consider the ef-
fect of three treatment variables: the size of the jury (three or six), the number of votes
needed for conviction (majority or unanimity), and jury deliberation. We nd evidence of
strategic voting under the unanimity rule, where the form of strategic behavior involves
a bias to vote guilty to compensate for the unanimity requirement. A large fraction
of jurors vote to convict even when their private information indicates the defendant is
more likely to be innocent than guilty. This is roughly consistent with the game theo-
retic predictions of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (FP) [1998]. While individual behavior is
explained well by the game theoretic model, at the level of the jury decision, there are
numerous discrepancies. In particular, contrary to the FP prediction, we nd that in our
experiments juries convict fewer innocent defendants under unanimity rule than under
majority rule. We are able to simultaneously account for the individual and group data
by using Quantal Response Equilibrium to model the error.
1 Introduction
Recent research in political science has addressed from a theoretical point of view the
question of how individuals behave in juries. The classic result in this area was the
Condorcet Jury Theorem, which dealt with a model of a jury in which all jurors have
identical preferences (they want to convict a guilty defendant, and acquit an innocent
defendant), but they dier in their probability of making a correct decision. In this
setting, the Condorcet Jury Theorem states that if the jury decision is made by majority
rule, then the probability that the jury makes a correct decision is higher than that of
any individual, and the probability of making a correct decision goes to one as the size
of the jury becomes very large.
Recently, Austen-Smith and Banks [1996] challenged the foundations of the Condorcet
Jury Theorem by questioning whether any game theoretic basis could be given for the
type of behavior assumed by the Condorcet Jury Theorem. They demonstrated that if
individuals start from a common prior about guilt of the defendant, and then obtain
private information, it is generally not a Nash equilibrium to vote sincerely (i.e., based
only on one's private information). Subsequent literature by Wit [1996] and McLennan
[1996] reestablished that the conclusions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem still hold if
individuals vote strategically according to a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium of the
game.
In a recent paper, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (FP) [1998] analyzed the Nash equi-
librium of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, with particular attention to the eect of the
decision rule. They compared the unanimous decision rule with decision rules requiring
only a majority or super majority to convict. They concluded that unanimous rule re-
sults in probabilities of convicting an innocent defendant that are higher than those for
majority rule, and which do not go to zero as the number of jurors goes to innity.
The model of Feddersen and Pesendorfer assumes that the jury decision is a simulta-
neous move game, in which all jurors vote without any communication beforehand. As
Coughlan [1997] shows, if it is possible to have a \straw poll" prior to the vote, then
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there exist equilibria in which voters reveal their information in the straw poll, and then
vote optimally based on the pooled information in the actual vote. This type of behavior
would eliminate the unattractive aspects of unanimity, as then decisions under majority
rule should be identical to those under unanimity.
Despite the active theoretical literature on juries, there has been relatively little ex-
perimental work to investigate the implications of these theories. The one exception is
the paper by Ladha, Miller and Oppenheimer [1996], who run experiments in which a
jury makes a sequence of decisions under majority rule. They nd evidence of strategic
behavior and also evidence that asymmetric Nash equilibria are sometimes played.
In this paper, we run experiments to test the Feddersen-Pesendorfer and Coughlan
predictions. In particular, we focus on the questions of whether jurors really vote strate-
gically, and whether unanimity rule leads to more convictions of innocent defendants
than majority rule. We are thus concerned with the eects of three treatment variables:
size of majority needed for conviction, eect of a straw poll, and the size of the jury. In
each of these treatments we consider the individual and group behavior.
Our basic ndings are that there is evidence of strategic behavior that is roughly con-
sistent with the Feddersen-Pesendorfer game theoretic model. That is, a large percentage
(between 30% and 50%) of jurors vote to convict even when their private information in-
dicates the defendant is more likely to be innocent than guilty. The percentage increases
with the size of the jury, as is predicted. While individual behavior is explained well by
the game theoretic model, at the level of the jury decision, there are numerous discrepan-
cies. In particular, contrary to the FP prediction, we nd that in our experiments juries
convict fewer innocent defendants under unanimity rule than under majority rule. We
are able to simultaneously account for the individual and group data by using Quantal
Response Equilibrium to model the error.
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2 The Condorcet Jury Model
The Condorcet jury model is meant to apply to a general class of group decision problems
where the members of group have a common interest, but hold dierent beliefs about
the true state of the world. By a common interest, what is meant is that if the state
of the world were common knowledge, then all group members would agree about which
decision to make. The dierences in beliefs create an information aggregation problem
which creates potential obstacles for the group to reach a consensus and to make the
\correct" decision. This class of decision problems has potential application to many real
world settings, including juries in criminal and civil trials, corporate strategy decisions
by boards of directors or partners, hiring and tenure decisions by faculty committees,
examinations judged subjectively by committees, and so forth. The rst of these, trial
juries was the subject of a recent paper in this Review by Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1997), and it is the main motivation for this paper.
The reader should keep in mind several things while reading this paper. First, the
model we study is meant to apply to a broad class of settings, and therefore cannot
capture all the interesting institutional details of one single setting, like a trial jury.
Second, it is an approximation, which leaves out some contextual components that may
aect behavior in specic applications. Third, it is meant to be simple, so that we can
isolate and study certain phenomena of theoretical interest. Fourth, it is exible, in the
sense that one can analyze the model using a wide range of dierent assumptions about
the degree of sophistication or rationality of the members of the group. In this sense,
while it is unquestionably a formal theoretical model, one can explore the implications
of bounded rationality as well as the implications of rational choice within the connes
of the same model. Thus it provides a very nice framework for conducting experiments
to compare rational choice and bounded rationality.
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2.1 Model Structure and Notation
We consider a game with a set N = f1; 2; :::; ng of n players (jurors), and let 1  k  n
represent the number of votes needed for conviction. The game begins by nature choosing
a state of the world in 
 = fG; Ig
1
, with probability s and 1 s, respectively. The players
do not observe the state that is selected, but each obtains some private information about
the state. If the true state isG, then each juror observes an independent Bernoulli random
variable which is g with probability p, and i with probability 1  p. If the true state is
I, then each juror observes an independent Bernoulli random variable which is i with
probability p and g with probability 1   p. After observing their private information,
jurors then vote for one of two actions in X = fC;Ag.
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If k or more jurors vote for C
the group decision is C, and otherwise the decision is A. The utility u : X  
 7! < of
each player is dened by u(A; I) = u(C;G) = 0 , U(C; I) =  q, and U(A;G) = q   1,
where 0 < q < 1.
In all of our examples, we will assume that s = :5, q = :5, and p = :7. We will
be concerned with two dierent voting rules, majority rule, in which case k is the least
integer greater than n=2, and unanimity, in which case k = n.
In our analysis, we will distinguish between two kinds of behavior, which we call
naive and strategic. By naive, we mean that voters ignore the group strategy aspect of
the decision problem and simply vote as if they were the only juror. In the above setting,
that means if they receive a guilty signal they vote to convict, and if they receive an
innocent signal they vote to acquit. This is the kind of behavior that was assumed by
Condorcet.
The second kind of behavior we consider is strategic. Contemporary game theorists,
including some political scientists (e.g. Austen-Smith and Banks) argue that we should
assume the individuals behave strategically rather than naively. They also prove formally
that naive and strategic behavior can have dramatically dierent logical implications in
1
Read \G" = Guilty, \I" = Innocent
2
Read \C" = Convict, \A" = Acquit
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the Condorcet jury model. In particular, strategic behavior by jurors is modeled using
game theory, which predicts that under certain specic circumstances it is optimal for
voters to vote against their signal. Our predictions about strategic behavior in these
experiments are given by the choice probabilities at Nash equilibria.
We also consider statistical versions of both of these types of behavior. Since we
observe all kinds of choices in our experiment, it is necessary to introduce an error
component to individual choices. For the case of naive behavior, we do this by assuming
that naive subjects vote with their signal with some xed probability, , and make
an error with probability 1   . The probability of correct choice is assumed to be
independent of the signal received and the same across all treatments. This becomes a
free parameter of the naive behavior model which allows us to t the data to the model
by standard estimation methods. For the case of strategic behavior, we incorporate the
error structure into the equilibrium concept, by using Quantal Response Equilibrium
(QRE). The QRE model (which is explained in more detail below) assumes that players
may deviate with some probability from best responses and the probability of deviation
depends on the expected payo dierence between the best response and the deviation.
We use a Logit parameterization of QRE, which includes a free parameter, , which
determines payo responsiveness. Higher values of  in the strategic model correspond
approximately to higher values of  in the naive model.
2.2 Strategic Behavior: Nash Equilibrium
To characterize equilibria, a strategy for a voter is a function  : fg; ig 7! [0; 1] taking
signals into probability of voting for conviction. There are trivial equilibria to the above
game in which voters ignore their information. However, of special interest are symmetric
\informative" equilibria to the above game. Symmetric equilibria require that jurors
with the same signal adopt the same (mixed) strategy. Informative equilibria are those
in which the jurors do not ignore their information.
As shown by Feddersen and Pesendorfer [1998], for the case of unanimity, the unique
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symmetric informative equilibrium requires that (g) = 1, and that the probability of
the defendant being guilty conditional on player i receiving an innocent signal, and all
other players voting guilty must be equal to q. I. e.,
q =
(1  p)g
n 1
G
(1  p)g
n 1
G
+ pg
n 1
I
where
g
G
= p(g) + (1  p)(i) (1)
g
I
= (1  p)(g) + p(i) (2)
are the probabilities that an individual votes to convict when the defendant is guilty or
innocent, respectively. Using (g) = 1, this implies that
(i) =
D
n
p  (1  p)
p D
n
(1  p)
where
D
n
=
 
(1  q)(1  p)
qp
!
1
n 1
Also, the probability that the jury votes incorrectly to convict an innocent defendant
(Pr[CjI] = (g
I
)
n
), and to acquit a guilty defendant (Pr[AjG] = 1 (g
G
)
n
), are determined
from the above formula. Table 1 (b) gives the values of (i), Pr[AjG], and Pr[CjI],
respectively for unanimity rule for certain values of n.
For majority rule, the formulae are slightly more complicated, but the symmetric
equilibrium is simpler, namely (g) = 1:0 and (i) = 0:0, regardless of the size of n.
3
We
can then compute the corresponding probabilities of convicting an innocent defendant
3
This is true for both the case of odd and even n, although it is somewhat more diÆcult to prove for
even n since the rule is no longer symmetric (n=2 votes to acquit suÆces to acquit, but more than
n
2
votes to convict are necessary to convict).
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(Pr[CjI] =
P
k>
n
2
(
n
k
)(1   p)
k
p
n k
) and of acquitting a guilty defendant (Pr[AjG] =
P
k
n
2
(
n
k
)p
k
(1   p)
n k
). These numbers are reported in Table 1 (a) for the parameter
values used in our experiment.
In the case of a straw poll, the game expands so that the jurors now have two votes. A
strategy is now a specication of how to vote in the straw poll, as a function of the juror's
signal, and then a specication of how to vote in the nal vote as a function of the signal
and the observed outcome of the straw poll for the nal vote. Let 
0
: fg; ig 7! [0; 1] be
the probability that the voter votes for conviction on the straw poll. Dene N
0
= N [ 0
to be the possible outcomes of the straw poll. Then let 
1
: fg; ig N
0
. For the case of
a straw poll, Coughlan (1997) shows that for the parameters used here, there is a fully
informative equilibrium in which all jurors reveal their signals on the straw vote (i. e.,

0
(i) = 0, and 
0
(g) = 1), and then vote based on the majority outcome of the straw
vote in the nal vote (i. e., 
1
(s;M(
0
)) =M(
0
), for all signals s 2 fi; gg, where M(
0
)
is zero or one or some appropriate mixing probability according to whether the majority
outcome of the straw poll was to convict or acquit, or a tie).
2.3 Strategic Behavior: Quantal Response Equilibrium
The above solutions all assume no error. McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998) propose a
general way to incorporate decision error, Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), which
is a statistical version of Nash equilibrium. The basic idea is that it is unreasonable to
expect individuals to always behave perfectly in accordance with rationality, and always
choose best responses to the other players. Instead, they choose better responses more
often than worse responses. Thus, rather than a deterministic model, QRE species
a probability distribution, 

() over actions. The probabilities are ordered by the ex-
pected payos of the actions, EU() according to some specic function, called a quantal
7
response function, which is just the statistical version of a best response function.
4
Thus,
actions with higher expected payo will be played more frequently and actions with lower
expected payos will be played less frequently. So, for any individual i and any pair
of actions available to i, say a and b, 

i
(a) > 

i
(b) if and only if EU
i
(a) > EU
i
(b).
The \E" of QRE stands for equilibrium, in the sense that the expected payos, EU(),
are themselves derived from the equilibrium probabilities, 

(). One can think of an
iterative process in which a given prole of choice probabilities for all the players results
determines a prole of expected payos for every action, which in turn (via the quantal
response function) generate a new prole of choice probabilities. A QRE is just a xed
point of this iterative process. Thus QRE retains the rational expectations avor of
Nash equilibrium, but relaxes the assumption that players choose optimal responses.
There are several ways to justify a formal model that has the above properties.
The idea that individuals choose stochastically rather than deterministically has been
proposed for a long time, for example to motivate reinforcement learning and discrete
choice econometrics. Alternatively, one can \rationalize" stochastic choice if players
have stochastic utility functions. Harsanyi (1973) proposed a model in this vein where
the game payo matrix is viewed as just an approximation of the utilities of the player
over outcomes in the game, and each player's actual utility vary about these means ac-
cording to some statistical distribution. Thus, in a QRE, for every action an individual
might choose, there is a privately observed payo disturbance for that action, and one
then looks at the Bayesian equilibrium to the corresponding game of private information.
This is equivalent to \smoothing out" the best response curves of the players and then
looking at a xed point of these smoothed out response functions, which is exactly what
QRE does.
Here we focus on a particularly tractable form of QRE, called Logit QRE, where the
quantal response functions are Logit curves. That is, for any pair of actions a and b we
4
In this paper, we use a Logit specication for the quantal response function. This is explained
below.
8
let ln[(a)=(b)] =   [EU(a)=EU(b)], where  is a response parameter.
In our game players have dierent information, and in some cases make a sequence of
decisions. Therefore, we turn to the extensive form of the game and represent proles
of action probabilities as behavior strategies, and apply QRE to the \agent" form of this
game.
5
Formally, let p = (p
1
; : : : ; p
n
) be a completely mixed prole of behavior strategies,
where p
i
= fp
ijk
g and p
ijk
is the probability that player i, with signal j 2 fi; gg votes for
k 2 fc; ag. Let u
ijk
(p) denote the expected utility to player i from taking action k with
signal j, given p: Then p

is a Logit equilibrium if and only if, for all i; j; k,
p

ijk
=
e
 u
ijk
(p

)
P
l
e
 u
ijl
(p

)
where again  > 0 is a free parameter determining the slope of players' logit response
curves. As we vary  from 0 to1, we can map out a family of QRE's which correspond to
dierent levels of rationality (or, more precisely: \payo responsiveness"). When  = 0,
response curves are completely at, so all strategies are used with equal probability (pure
error, or zero rationality). When  approaches 1, logit response curves converge to
standard best response curves, so players use only optimal strategies (no error, or perfect
rationality). This family of QRE's has several interesting properties that are described in
McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998). For example, if we consider a convergent sequence
of logit equilibria for a sequence of  values converging to 1, the limit point must be a
Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. In this sense, Nash equilibrium is just a very
special boundary case of QRE, which corresponds to perfect rationality.
We also consider an alternate model of errors combined with strategic behavior, called
the Noisy Nash Model (NNM), which also looks at statistical variation around the Nash
equilibrium, but diers from QRE in two ways. First, it does not incorporate the rational
expectations assumption of QRE. The NNM model assumes that individuals follow Nash
behavior with some xed probability  (to be estimated), and choose randomly
6
with
5
See McKelvey and Palfrey (1998) for details.
6
That is, they vote to convict or to acquit with equal probability.
9
probability 1   . Like QRE, in the limiting case when  approaches 1, the prediction
approaches Nash equilibrium. However, for intermediate values of the error term, it will
often dier from QRE. The dierence is twofold. First, NNM assigns the same probability
of deviating from Nash equilibrium (1   ) regardless of the expected utility loss from
such a deviation. Second, NNM is not an equilibrium model. Recall that QRE is dened
as a xed point of in terms of choice probabilities and Logit responses, That is, each
player's errors (deviations from Nash play) aect the expected payos of all the other
players, and hence will indirectly aect all other players' Logit responses. In contrast,
under NNM, there is no such \feedback", so that one player's deviations from Nash play
has no indirect eect on any other player's deviations from Nash play. See McKelvey and
Palfrey (1998), McKelvey, Palfrey, and Weber (forthcoming), and Fey, McKelvey, and
Palfrey (1996) for further discussion of the dierences between QRE and NNM. Similar to
QRE, we can map out a family of NNM predictions by varying the free parameter  from
0 to 1.
7
When  = 0, all strategies are used with equal probability (pure error, or zero
rationality). When  approaches 1, predictions of NNM converge to Nash equilibrium.
The symmetric portion of the Logit AQRE correspondence for jury sizes n = 3 and
n = 6 and both the majority and unanimity voting rules are displayed as the thick solid
curves in Figures 1 and 2.
8
Each graph is on the unit square of mixed behavior strategies
of a representative player. The horizontal and vertical axes of each of the four graphs
correspond to the probability of voting to convict, given innocent and guilty signals,
respectively. At the center of each unit square is the \pure error" Logit equilibrium that
corresponds to  = 0. As  increases, the equilibrium curves converge to the symmetric
Nash equilibrium, which is on the upper boundary of the unit square (the upper left
corner, in the case of majority rule).
In a similar fashion, one constructs the correspondences dened by the NNM model
7
As with QRE, we limit attention to the NNM corresponding to the symmetric mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium.
8
Later in the paper we present and discuss the asymmetric components of this correspondence. The
large dots in the gures are explained in the data analysis section.
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and the Naive (non-strategic) model, by varying  between 0 and 1. Referring to Figure 1,
the NNM correspondence is simply the line segment (not drawn) connecting the center of
the probability square(pure error) to the symmetric Nash equilibrium. The Naive model
correspondence is simply the line segment connecting the center to the upper left corner
of the strategy space. This vertex corresponds to \honest" voting.
In the appendix we are able to fully characterize, and compute the symmetric quantal
response equilibrium correspondence for the 3-person unanimous jury game with a straw
vote. The characterization of the majority rule QRE correspondence is similar, and
is not included in the appendix. Unfortunately, our eorts to compute the symmetric
quantal response equilibrium correspondence for the majority rule juries with a straw
vote were unsuccessful. Also, we found that the 6-person jury game with a straw vote is
too complex to compute the QRE correspondence, using our numerical methods.
3 Experimental Design
We conducted a total of four experiments, using as subjects undergraduate and graduate
students at the California Institute of Technology. Each experiment used twelve subjects
(plus one subject that was used as a monitor). The experiment was divided into four ses-
sions. Between sessions, two treatment variables were varied, the decision rule (Majority
or Unanimity) and the existence of a straw poll (Yes or No). The treatment variables
were varied according to the design in Table 2, which gives the particulars of each exper-
iment. In each session the subjects participated in a sequence of fteen \matches"
9
. In
each match the subjects were randomly matched in groups of size n, where n was one of
the treatment variables, and a jury game similar to that described in the previous section
was conducted. In that table, for each session, the values of each treatment variables
and the number of sessions is given. For example \U/N (15)" means 15 matches with
9
The last three sessions of Experiment CJ1 were truncated to ten matches each, due to one particularly
slow subject.
11
Unanimity decision rule and No straw poll. All matches in the same experiment were
run with the same number of subjects. Subjects were paid in cash at the end of the
experiment. Subjects were paid a \show up fee" of $5:00, plus whatever they earned in
the experiment.
In the experiments that were conducted, the subjects were not told that the experi-
ment was intended to represent a jury decision. The states of the world were called the
Red Jar and Blue Jar instead of Guilty and Innocent, and instead of choosing to Convict
or Acquit, the subjects were instructed to guess whether the true jar was Red or Blue.
The complete instructions are given in the appendix.
Briey, each match proceeded as follows: The subjects were told that there were two
jars, a Red Jar and a Blue Jar. The Red jar contains seven red balls and 3 blue balls,
and the Blue Jar contains seven blue balls and 3 red balls. One of the jars was selected
for each group. The jar which was selected was determined by the roll of a die by the
monitor (a subject chosen at random from the group of subjects at the beginning of
the experiment).
10
The subjects were not told which jar was selected, but were each
allowed to choose one ball at random from the jar that was selected.
11
After choosing a
ball, they then voted, for either the Red Jar or the Blue Jar. Two decision rules were
investigated; majority rule and unanimity. The decision rule, which had been explained
to them prior to the session, was used to determine the group decision, and their payos
were determined based on whether the group decision was correct or incorrect. They
received fty cents if the group decision was correct, and ve cents if it was incorrect.
10
The die was rolled once for each group in each match, so in each match, dierent groups could have
dierent states.
11
This was accomplished by placing the balls in a random order on their computer screen, with the
colors hidden. Subjects then used the mouse to select one of the balls and reveal its color. To convince
them that this procedure was conducted honestly, prior to the experiment, we generated the order of
the samples for each match, each group, each possible state, and each subject. The samples in the
experiment were generated according to this list. Subjects recorded which ball they selected in each
match, and were free to peruse the list after the match to verify that there were the correct number of
balls of each color, and that the ball they selected was of the correct color.
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4 Results
4.1 Jury behavior without deliberation
Table 3 (a) shows the realizations of the voter strategies for the case when there is
no straw poll. Recall that in this instance the prediction is that under majority rule,
voters should vote the same direction as their signal (convicting with a guilty signal, and
acquitting with an innocent signal). Under unanimity, the prediction is that with a guilty
signal one should vote to convict, and with an innocent signal, one should mix, voting
with a probability of either .314 or .651 to convict, depending on whether the group size
is 3 or 6.
The data provide some support these predictions, for both the majority rule treatment
and the unanimity treatment. Under majority rule, the subjects vote the same direction
as their signals over 94% of the time, with the only exception being the case of innocent
signals in a jury of size 6, in which case the subjects err 21% of the time. This seems
like a surprising result, but can be explained by the fact that the Nash equilibrium in
the 6-person majority rule experiments is a weak Nash equilibrium. In the symmetric
equilibrium of that game, those voters receiving innocent signals are indierent between
voting to acquit and voting to convict. In the QRE, this indierence leads to a prediction
that voters with innocent signals will vote against their signal more frequently than voters
with guilty signals, for every positive value of .
For the case of unanimity, voters frequently vote to convict when they get an innocent
signal. Jurors with a guilty signal still tend to vote guilty { strongly so for a jury of size
3, and less strongly with a jury of size 6. However, when they get an innocent signal, the
subjects vote to convict at a rate of 36% for the 3 person jury, and 48% for the 6 person
jury. For the case of the three person jury, this is very close to the Nash predicted value
of .314. For the case of a six person jury, the rate is signicantly below the predicted
value of .651.
Since the Nash equilibrium of the game requires that in some cases a pure strategy
13
is adopted, any observations in which subjects do not follow that strategy are enough to
statistically reject the Nash equilibrium as a model of behavior. Thus, any game theoretic
model that is to explain the data must incorporate a model of where error comes from. In
section 2, we proposed 3 alternative models of behavior that incorporated error: Naive
(non-strategic); Logit QRE; and NNM.
Table 4 gives the results of estimating the free parameters in these three models. Note
that because of the symmetry of the game, all three models make identical predictions
for the three person majority rule case. Also, the aggregate choice frequencies from all
the non-deliberation data are superimposed (large dots) in Figures 1 and 2. The rst
(and perhaps most important) thing to observe is that the Naive model does very poorly.
In other words, voters are behaving as if they understand the strategic subtleties of the
decision problem. For the NNM model we estimate  to be in the 0:90 to 0:93 range for
three person. Since (1  ) is the probability of choosing randomly, this corresponds to
an error rate of less than ve percent. For six person juries, we estimate  to be in the
0:75 to 0:78 range, corresponding to an error rate slightly greater than ten percent. For
the case of six person juries, the QRE ts signicantly better than the NNM under both
majority and unanimity rules. In the case of three person juries under unanimity, the
ts of QRE and NNM are almost identical, with no signicant dierence between the
two. The Naive model is rejected in favor of the QRE for all treatments where the two
models make distinct predictions.
4.2 Jury Behavior with deliberation
As is evident from Table 3(b), in juries with a straw poll, the nal vote can no longer be
predicted as well using the equilibrium of the Feddersen-Pesendorfer model. On average
individuals getting a guilty signal vote to acquit about 15% of the time, independent of
the treatments. Those getting an innocent signal vote to convict (against their signal)
between 16  37%, and this percentage depends on the treatment. This is a higher rate
of voting against their signals than for those who obtain a guilty signal, but we do not
14
get the same dierences between majority rule and unanimity as we had in the case of
no straw poll.
Table 5 presents the analysis of the straw poll sessions based on the Coughlan equi-
librium. Recall that this equilibrium predicts that subjects will reveal their signal in the
straw poll, and then vote based on the majority outcome of the straw poll in the nal
vote. Here we see that the subjects for the most part do use the straw poll to reveal their
signal. Over 90% of the subjects in every cell (except one cell which is 89.7%) reveal
their signal in the straw poll. Possibly of some interest is the additional nding that
false revelation of innocent signals occurs with greater frequency than false revelation of
guilty signals in all four treatments. Overall, false revelation of innocent signals is about
twice as frequent as false revelation of guilty signals.
In the nal vote, when the outcome of the straw poll does not end up with a tie, in all
treatments voters vote with the public signal 84% of the time or above. One might expect
the numbers to be higher here. In an equilibrium of the Coughlan type, individuals should
ignore their own signals, and only pay attention to the public signal. Table 6 gives the
result of a probit analysis of the nal vote against the individual's private signal and the
publicly available information. For the public information for an individual (the variable
\PubInfo"), we use the number of other individuals who voted to convict in the straw
poll plus the information of the individual (1 for a guilty signal, 0 for an innocent signal).
If voters are following the Coughlan equilibrium, then they should base their vote on the
public information, and ignore their private information. The probit analysis indicates
that this is not the case. The individual's private information has a signicant eect on
the nal vote for all combinations of treatment variables.
There are several possible explanations for why the straw poll does not work perfectly.
The simplest explanation we have is based on the results of the treatment without a
straw poll. Even in the simplest, 3-person majority rule juries, some voters fail to vote
sincerely. This source of error causes a small eect if there is no straw poll, and the QRE
model showed in the last section how these small eects could be accounted for using an
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equilibrium model with errors. However, with a straw poll, the relatively small eects
of errors and the initial voting stage become compounded in the second stage since the
noisy behavior in the straw poll means that voters are not sure how to interpret the
results of the straw poll. If individuals believe that there is some likelihood that others
will not perfectly follow the rst stage equilibrium, then they should give some weight
to their own private information on the second stage. This in turn has a snowball eect
on straw poll behavior because they know that other voters will be uncertain how to
interpret their (straw) vote. Since QRE is an equilibrium model, it can capture this
eect of compounding errors.
Appendix 2 presents a QRE analysis of the straw vote game for the 3-person unanimity
treatment, including a table that presents the maximum likelihood estimates of , and
. Our computational algorithm was unable to compute the QRE correspondence for
majority rule game or the 6-person games. The main ndings is summarized as follows,
with a more detailed account contained in the appendix.
There are several important features of the QRE correspondence. First, for higher
values of , there are multiple symmetric equilibria, corresponding to the various Nash
equilibria. Second, the graph is not well behaved, as it contains two points of bifurcation.
Third, one of these corresponds to the informative equilibrium studied by Coughlan
[1998], and it is the component of the QRE correspondence that most closely matches
the data. Fourth, this component has the feature that voters are conditioning their nal
vote on their own signal as well as the vote outcome in the nal round. In particular,
for any xed number of votes to convict in the straw vote, the probability of voting to
convict in the nal stage is higher if one observed a guilty signal than if one observed an
innocent signal. Fifth, the probability of voting to convict in the nal vote is monotonic
in the number of straw votes to convict.
These features of the QRE are consistent with the data, and consistent with the
simple probit analysis of Table 6. However, while the main qualitative predictions are
QRE are found in the data, the quantitative t is less successful. In fact, the maximum
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likelihood t of the NNM is better than the t of the QRE model. Further details and
discussion are in Appendix 2.
4.3 Jury Accuracy
Table 7 presents a summary of the accuracy of the nal decision of the jury as a function
of the experimental treatment variables. We compare the actual data with the Nash
equilibrium predictions of error rates, given in Table 1. First, in the experimental data,
under unanimity the probability of voting to convict an innocent defendant goes down
from .190 to .029 in our data as the jury becomes larger (this dierence is signicant
at the .05 level using a dierence of proportion test, with a t value of t = 2:223). The
Nash theory predicts the opposite (from .14 to .19). Furthermore, the error rate for six
person unanimous juries is lower than the error rate for majority juries (.03 vs .30), in
the innocent state. This dierence (signicant at the :01 level, with t = 2:924) is also
counter to the Nash theory. As for majority juries, error rates decline with larger juries
in the guilty state, and increase with larger juries in the innocent state. This is exactly
the opposite of what is predicted to happen in the Nash equilibrium.
We view the contradictions with the aggregate theoretical predictions as surprising,
especially given that the individual choice frequencies are not very dierent from the the-
oretical choice frequencies. We interpret this to mean that the accuracy of jury decisions
is not a robust phenomenon. That is, small changes in individual choice behavior can
result in large changes in the probability of an erroneous judgment. This is especially
true for unanimous juries, where a small amount of juror decision error can produce a
much larger number of acquittals than is predicted by the Nash equilibrium.
As evidence in support of the above claim, we have computed the expected jury
accuracy under the QRE model. These are reported in Table 7 (a). To compute these
values, we used the maximum likelihood QRE estimates of (i) and (g) from Table
4, and substituted in to equations (1) and (2) to get values of g
G
and g
I
. Then the
probabilities P (CjI) and P (AjG) are computed by the corresponding binomial formulas
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used in Table 1. We see that the jury accuracy implications of the QRE estimates match
the data better than the Nash predictions. All of the above discrepancies except one are
explained by the QRE predictions. In particular, the QRE predicts that under unanimity,
the probability of convicting an innocent defendant should go down (from .19 to .07) as
the size of the jury increases. This is consistent with the data.
Turning now to the experiments with a straw poll, we nd that the presence of a straw
vote increased the accuracy of judgments in the guilty state, but there was essentially
no eect in the innocent state. Thus, it appears that the probability of convicting an
innocent defendant does not improve with deliberation, but the probability of acquitting
in the guilty state declines substantially. Comparing to the theoretical predictions, in
this case we can compute the Nash predictions. With a straw vote, the fully informing
Nash equilibrium predicts that both majority and unanimous juries should have identical
accuracies to each other, and they should also be identical to the case of majority rule
without a straw poll. This is true since the equilibrium strategy is to reveal your signal
in the straw poll, and then for all voters to vote on the nal ballot based on whether the
number of reported guilty signals exceeds
n
2
.
4.4 Jury Accuracy in the Logit Equilibrium
As pointed out earlier, the game-theoretic analysis of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997)
implies that large unanimous juries will convict innocent defendants with fairly high
probability, while the probability of such errors in large majority juries will vanish. Even
in juries of size six, the probability of convicting an innocent defendant is predicted to
be higher with unanimity rule than with majority rule. This does not happen in our
experiment. We nd in both the three and six person juries that errors of this kind are
more prevalent with majority juries than with unanimous juries.
We show here that the Logit equilibrium predicts that we should be observing this.
Specically, we can show that for any Logit parameter,  < 1, the probability of con-
viction goes to zero in large unanimous juries. In contrast, for any  > 0, the probability
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of a majority-rule jury error in the symmetric informative Logit equilibrium goes to 0 as
jury size increases, regardless of the state of the world. We rst show that the probability
a voter votes innocent in a Logit equilibrium is bounded below by an expression that is
independent of n.
Theorem 1 Fix  < 1: For every Æ > 0, there exists N(Æ; ) such that for all n >
N(Æ; ), the probability of acquittal in any Logit AQRE is greater than 1   Æ regardless
of whether the defendant is innocent or guilty.
Proof. Writing p

iga
and p

igc
for the probability voter i votes to acquit and convict,
respectively with a guilty signal, it follows that in any logit AQRE,
p

iga
=
1
1 + e
[u
igc
(p

) u
iga
(p

)]
>
1
1 + e

since u
igc
(p

)  u
iga
(p

) < 1: A similar argument establishes that p

iia
>
1
1+e

:
The theorem now follows immediately, because the lower bound on both p
iga
and p
iia
are independent of n.
Theorem 2 Fix  < 1; and consider the Logit AQRE of the unanimous jury game
with a straw poll: For every Æ > 0, there exists N(Æ; ) such that for all n > N(Æ; ),
the probability of acquittal is greater than 1   Æ regardless of whether the defendant is
innocent or guilty.
Proof. The argument from the previous theorem applies to the nal stage of the straw
poll in exactly the same way as it applies to the case with no straw poll. Therefore,
the lower bound on p
iga
and p
iia
identied in the previous theorem is the same, and is
independent of n. The result follows immediately.
Therefore, we see that (Logit) equilibrium behavior is entirely consistent with tra-
ditional jurisprudential theory that argues for unanimous juries as a protection against
the conviction of innocent defendants. The reason is that the Nash equilibrium convic-
tion/acquittal probabilities are not robust to decision errors. In order for the probability
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of convicting an innocent to increase, the probability of voting to acquit must go to zero
extremely fast in the number of jurors (on the order of 1=n) since the probability of
conviction is equal to (1 p

ia
)
n
: If the probability of voting to acquit goes to 0 any slower
than this, then defendants will always be acquitted by large juries. That is, unanimous
juries will become completely uninformative.
In our unanimous jury data, we nd a couple of interesting facts that match up with
these results. First, both with and without straw polls, innocent defendants are wrongly
convicted less frequently in our large juries than our small juries. Second, both with
and without straw polls, the probability of acquitting a guilty defendant increases in n.
Both of these are the opposite of what the Nash theory predicts, but are consistent with
the Logit equilibrium, which predicts that unanimous juries will become more heavily
biased toward acquittal as jury size increases. With majority rule this acquittal bias does
not occur, but at the nontrivial cost of roughly 50% higher wrongful conviction rates of
innocent defendants.
4.5 Individual Behavior, Heterogeneity, and Asymmetric Equi-
libria
The theoretical work underlying this experiment focused entirely on symmetric informa-
tive equilibria. As noted in passing earlier, there are many equilibria in these voting
games, all of which satisfy standard renement criteria such as perfection, properness
and stability. In this section we investigate whether the data could be interpreted as
evidence either for uninformative equilibria or for asymmetric equilibria.
With regard to uninformative equilibria, there is clear evidence against this. The
unique uninformative equilibrium for the unanimity game has all voters always voting
to acquit, independent of their actual signal. Table 7 clearly shows that voting is in fact
very informative in the unanimity games with and without straw polls. Thus we conclude
that the data does not provide evidence of this kind of behavior.
The question of asymmetric equilibria is more subtle, and more problematic as well.
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A necessary condition for the presence of asymmetric equilibria is that there be some
evidence of heterogeneity in the observed decision rules of dierent jurors, within the
same treatment. We nd strong evidence for heterogeneity in our data. As a simple way
to categorize voter behavior, we classify voters into one of three strategy-types, based
on how they vote when they receive an innocent signal.
12
Strategy-type-1 jurors always
vote sincerely; that is, (i) = 0. We call these honest voters \Sincere." Strategy-type-2
voters mix when they receive an innocent signal; that is, (i) > 0. We call these voters
\Mixers." Strategy-type-3 jurors always vote to convict, independent of their signal;
that is, (i) = 1. We call these voters \Rednecks."
13
To implement this classication,
we simply use actual frequency of voter choices.
Table 8 presents the breakdown of strategy types by session. Overall, 25% of the
voters are always sincere, 56% mix, and 19% always vote to convict.
The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of guilty votes and the total number
of innocent signals observed by all voters classied in that cell. For example, in session 1,
there were four voters who always voted sincerely when they received an innocent signal
in the unanimity/no-deliberation treatment. Those voters received a total of 31 innocent
signals and voted to acquit in every instance. In that same session, seven subjects mixed
{ that is, they neither always voted to acquit nor always voted to convict when they
received an innocent signal. That set of voters received a total of 57 innocent signals and
voted to convict 24 times.
To illustrate the range of possible asymmetric equilibria in jury games, consider the
simplest case of three juror unanimity juries with no deliberation. In this case there is
an equilibrium with two Rednecks and one sincere voter. To see this is an equilibrium,
rst look at the Rednecks. Either of them is pivotal if and only if the sincere voter votes
to convict, which happens only if the sincere voter received a guilty signal. Thus the
12
Since nearly all jurors always vote to convict with a guilty signal, we do not break down the individual
strategy types based on that.
13
There are no voters who always vote to acquit.
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best response is to vote to convict with a guilty signal, and to voter either to convict
or to acquit (indierent) with an innocent signal. For the sincere voter, since the other
two voters are always voting to convict, conditioning on being pivotal is uninformative,
so sincere behavior is strictly optimal for either signal. Using similar reasoning, one
can easily show that for any probability p 2 [0; 1], there is an equilibrium with one
sincere voter, one redneck, and one Mixer voting to convict with a innocent signal with
probability p (and always voting to convict with a guilty signal). An even wider range of
asymmetric equilibria exist with 6 person juries. Ladha[1998] has shown that the pure
strategy asymmetric Nash equilibria maximize the accuracy of information aggregation
in jury games.
While we have not fully characterized the asymmetric equilibria in this paper, the
point is clear: There are lots of equilibria, and so the empirical restrictions of equilibrium
behavior are limited. But we point out that in all of these equilibria for three person
juries, the aggregate probability of a vote to convict, given an innocent signal, is above
1=3.
The issue of asymmetric equilibria is further complicated if one takes into account
the possibility that subjects may make errors. In Figure 3, we have plotted the full
QRE correspondence for the three person unanimity game under the assumption that
iteratively dominated strategies are not played (i. e., a player receiving a guilty signal
always votes guilty). Even under this assumption, it is evident from the gure that
the full QRE correspondence is quite complicated. First, it is evident that the QRE
correspondence has several places where it bifurcates. This is not a feature of the QRE
correspondence, and happens in this game because the game is symmetric, and hence
not a generic game. In generic games, it is shown in McKelvey and Palfrey [1995, 1998]
that the principal branch of the QRE correspondence selects a unique equilibrium (i.e,
there is no bifurcation) . For non generic games, such as the ones for these jury games,
such a selection is no longer possible. In this case, the forks, or bifurcations in the QRE
correspondence are places where the equilibrium correspondence branches to connect to
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the asymmetric equilibria. Thus, if we drop the focus on symmetric equilibria, the QRE
gives us no guidance as to which asymmetric equilibrium should be selected. Further,
if subjects make errors, then in addition to the limiting points of the correspondence,
one predicts that other points on the correspondence could occur. If there is a failure to
coordinate on any equilibrium, then matters are further complicated.
Figure 3 deals only with the three person jury. For the case of a six person jury,
things become even more complicated. Figure 4 plots the symmetric part of the QRE
correspondence for the six person jury using unanimity rule. This graph is the same as
that in Figure 2 (b), but viewed from a dierent projection into the coordinate axes.
In this view, we see that even the principal branch of the symmetric part of the QRE
correspondence is not monotonic in . Thus, if one follows the QRE principal branch of
the QRE starting at  = 0, one reaches a point (at about  = 15) where the curve bends
backward for a while. In this region, the symmetric branch of the QRE is multiple valued.
For the six person case, we have not been able to compute the full QRE correspondence
that would include the asymmetric QRE. But since there is no unique selection of a
symmetric QRE for some values of , this may even further increase the probability of a
lack of coordination, and increase the tendency towards asymmetric behavior.
5 Learning
The jury game we implemented in the laboratory is very complicated. We ask subjects
to make choices based on limited partial information in an uncertain environment with
asymmetric information. They are not guided by any natural clues that would make it
easy to connect the group decision problem they are solving to real-life situations that
they have experienced. This is intentional, since we do not wish to bias their decisions
or distort their induced preferences in ways that are diÆcult to predict or measure.
Furthermore, in order to make the most of this information, they need to anticipate
how other subjects in the room will make decisions based on their (dierent) partial
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information.
Given the complexity of the task, we expect to nd trends in the data. For example,
the concept of conditioning your decision on the event that your vote is pivotal is a very
subtle idea, yet is the main idea underlying the equilibrium of these jury games. Thus it
is conceivable that in early rounds subjects are less aware of this equilibrium eect and
experience is required before it aects their decision making. The diÆculty of the task
was one of the factors motivating the repeated trial feature in our design.
For the majority rule experiments, the aggregate data are a close match to the equi-
librium prediction that voters will be sincere. This is not surprising since the simple
intuitive rule of voting sincerely corresponds to the optimal decision rule when one con-
ditions on being pivotal. In the 6-person juries with majority rule, we nd signicantly
more deviations from sincere voting, but this can be explained by the fact that for 6-
person juries, voting sincerely is only a weak equilibrium. That is, with an innocent
signal, a juror is indierent between voting guilty and voting innocent.
To test whether the observed phenomenon of strategic voting is partly the result of
learning, we focus on the decisions by voters with innocent signals in the unanimity
treatments with no straw poll. This is the only case in our experiment where voters
are predicted to vote against their signal in the Nash equilibrium. For these voters, we
compare the frequency of voting to convict for the rst ve rounds of data and the last
ve rounds of data. What we nd is that for all four sessions, the frequency of voting
to convict in the last ve rounds is higher than in the rst ve rounds and it is closer to
the Nash equilibrium prediction.
As expected, the time trend data from other voter types in other treatments does not
show much of a pattern. Breaking it down by session, treatment and signal (a total of
28 cases), we nd that in 61% of the cases the decision frequencies move closer to the
Nash equilibrium or remain constant
14
in the later periods, while in 54% of the cases
14
In all but one of the cases where there is no change between the rst and last periods, all the early
data are exactly at the Nash equilibrium.
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the decision frequencies are further from the Nash equilibrium in the later periods.
6 Conclusions
We nd that in these experimental juries, there is a denite tendency to vote strategi-
cally in the case of a unanimous rule and no straw vote. With 3-person juries, voters
with innocent signals vote more than one-third of the time for conviction. This is very
close to the Nash equilibrium prediction. With 6-person juries, this frequency increases
signicantly, also as predicted by the theory, although the increase is not as great as
Nash equilibrium predicts.
While individual behavior is explained well by the game theoretic model, at the level
of the jury decision, there are numerous discrepancies. In particular, contrary to the
FP prediction, we nd that in our experiments juries convict fewer innocent defendants
under unanimity rule than under majority rule, and larger juries convict fewer innocent
defendants than smaller juries under unanimity. We are able to simultaneously account
for the individual and group data by using Quantal Response Equilibrium to model the
error.
With deliberation, which we implement experimentally with non-binding straw polls,
jurors tend to reveal their signals in the straw poll, but not to the full extent predicted
by the theory. Most voters then use the information from the straw vote to make their
nal vote. Thus, introduction of straw polls largely (but not completely) eliminates the
strategic voting in the case of unanimous juries. Surprisingly, straw polls lead to more
strategic voting with majority juries than with unanimous juries. The fact that there is
a residual of strategic revelation even with straw polls results in some departure from the
\sincere" equilibrium path of the nal stage. As expected, introduction of straw polls
increases the frequency with which juries make correct decisions in the case of a guilty
defendant.
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Appendix 1: Experiment instructions
DECISION MAKING EXPERIMENT
(Condorcet Jury)
This is an experiment in group decision making, and you will be paid for your participa-
tion in cash, at the end of the experiment. Dierent subjects may earn dierent amounts.
What you earn depends partly on your decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and
partly on chance.
The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals, and all interaction
between you will take place through the computers. It is important that you not talk or
in any way try to communicate with other subjects during the experiments.
We will start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction period, you will
be given a complete description of the experiment and will be shown how to use the
computers. If you have any questions during the instruction period, raise your hand and
your question will be answered so everyone can hear. If any diÆculties arise after the
experiment has begun, raise your hand, and an experimenter will come and assist you.
In this experiment, one subject will act as a monitor. The monitor will be paid a xed
amount ($20.00) for the experiment. The monitor will assist in running the experiment
by generating random numbers for use in the experiment, and serving as someone who
can check that the experiment is run correctly. We will select the monitor by having you
each select an envelope. Open your envelope, and read the card inside to determine if
you are the monitor.
[PASS OUT ENVELOPES]
Will the monitor please go to the master computer, and we will now pass out record
sheets to the subjects in the experiments.
[PASS OUT RECORD SHEETS]
Please put your name at the top of the record sheet. The experiment you are partici-
pating in is broken down into 4 separate sessions. Each session will consist of 15 matches.
At the end of the last match of the last session, you will be paid the total amount you
have accumulated during the course of the 4 sessions. Everyone will be paid in private
and you are under no obligation to tell others how much you earned. Your earnings are
denominated in FRANCS. Your DOLLAR earnings are determined by multiplying your
earning in FRANCS by a conversion rate. In this experiment, the conversion rate is .005,
meaning that 100 FRANCS is worth 50 cents.
We will now begin the computer instructions for the rst session. We will teach you
about the experiment and how to use the computer by going through a short practice
match. During the instruction session, do not hit any keys until you are told to do so,
and when you are told to enter information, type exactly what you are told to type. You
are not paid for the practice match.
[START JURY PROGRAM]
When the computer prompts you for your name, type your full name. Then hit the
ENTER key, and conrm by typing Y.
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FIRST SCREEN
You now see the rst screen of the experiment. At the top center of the screen, you see
your subject number. Please record that on your record sheet now. This session consist
of 15 matches. In each match, you will be matched with another group of subjects. Your
group number and the number of subjects you are matched with is on the top right side
of your screen. In this session, each of you is matched with two other subjects, in groups
of size 3.
There are two jars, which we call the Red Jar and the Blue Jar. The Red Jar contains
7 Red balls and 3 Blue balls. The Blue Jar contains 7 Blue balls, and 3 Red balls. At
the beginning of the match, we will randomly choose one of the two Jars for your group.
This will be done by the monitor, who will roll a dice to determine the color. If an odd
number is rolled, the jar will be Blue, if an even number is rolled, the jar will be Red.
Dierent groups may have dierent colors. You will not be told which Jar has been
chosen. You may now press a key to advance to the next screen.
SECOND SCREEN
To help you determine which Jar has been selected for your group, each member of
your group will be allowed to select one ball, at random, from the Jar. This is done on
the computer by randomly ordering the balls in the Jar for each subject, but leaving the
colors hidden. You can then use the mouse to click on one of ten balls. When you select a
ball, its color will be revealed to you, and displayed on your screen, and you must record
this information on your record sheet. This is called your "Sample". You are not told
the colors of the sample balls drawn by the other members of your group. Note that the
balls are numbered. This is just so that you can remember and record which ball you
selected.
Each subject in your group selects a ball on their own, and only sees their own sample
ball. The balls are ordered dierently for each subject. However, all the members of your
group have the same number of Red and Blue balls. That is, if the true color of the jar
for your group were Red, then all members of your group are drawing their sample balls
from a list containing 7 Red and 3 Blue balls. If the true color of your group's jar is
Blue, then all members of your group would be drawing their sample balls from a list
containing 3 Red and 7 Blue balls. Please select a ball now, and record its color and
number on your record sheet. When you have nished recording, press a key to continue.
THIRD SCREEN
After everyone has drawn their sample, you will be asked to vote for either a Red Jar
or a Blue Jar.
[READ EITHER A OR B]
A Unanimity instructions: If (and only if) everyone in your group votes Red, your
group decision is Red. Otherwise, your group decision is Blue. That is, if anyone
in your group votes Blue, the group decision is Blue.
B Majority rule instructions: If a majority (two or more) of your group votes Red,
then the group decision is Red. Otherwise, your group decision is Blue. That is,
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your group's decision will be whichever color receives more votes.
The table on this screen tells you your payos. If your group's decision is the same
as the true color, then the decision is correct, and each member of your group earns 100
francs. If your group decision is dierent from the true color of the Jar, then the group
decision is incorrect, and each member of the group earns 10 francs. You may vote by
selecting, with your mouse, either the Red or the Blue Jar, and then conrming. In the
actual experiment, you may vote however you like. In the practice match, please vote
Red if you are on the left side of the room, and Blue if you are on the right side of the
room. Please vote now.
FOURTH SCREEN
After everyone has voted, the vote is tallied, and you and the others in your group
will be told what the result of the vote was, and what the true color of the Jar for your
group was. Please hit a key to proceed
FIFTH SCREEN
After all decisions have been made, you are given a summary of the decisions up to
now. Please record this information on your record sheet. This marks the end of the
match. After you have recorded all of the information, please hit a key to continue.
SIXTH SCREEN { DISPLAY OVERHEAD
We will now illustrate in more detail how the sample is drawn. Your computer screen
now shows the balls you drew your sample from with all of the colors revealed. The ball
that you drew is outlined with a white box.
Prior to the experiment, all of the lists of sample balls for each subject, and each
match, and each possible true Jar color have been generated by a random number gener-
ator. We have a printout of this information that will be available to the monitor. You
now see on the overhead projector screen a copy of the rst page of this data, which is
for the practice match. Find your subject number and the true color of your groups jar.
Compare the display on your computer screen to that on the overhead projector. The
color of the balls should be identical. Please look at the overhead projector screen. Note
also that the ordering of the balls for all subjects is dierent, even if they are drawing
from the same Jar.
During the actual experiment, you will not be shown this screen. However, your
samples will be done in exactly the same way. We have printed out the similar sheet for
all of the matches to follow. If you record the number of the ball that you drew each
match, then at the end of the experiment, if you wish, you may ask the monitor to check
your sample against this sheet to verify that the ball you selected was the correct color.
After a match is over, and everyone has recorded the information about their match,
you will be randomly re-matched into another group consisting of dierent subjects. A
new jar will be randomly drawn for your group, you will get a new sample from a jar of
the group color, you will vote, and a group decision will be determined as described above.
After we have nished 15 matches in this manner, the rst session of the experiment will
be over, and we will give you instructions for the next session.
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Are there any questions before we begin with the actual experiment
[EXPERIMENTER TAKE QUESTIONS]
We will now begin with the actual experiment. If there are any problems from this
point on, raise your hand and an experimenter will come and assist you.
[START EXPERIMENT]
RULES FOR EXPERIMENT SESSION #2
This experiment session will also last for 15 matches. The rules are the same as in
the rst session, with one exception.
[READ A OR B]
A Recall that in the previous session, your group decision was Red if and only if all
three members of your group voted Red. Otherwise your group decision was Blue.
In this session there will be a slight change in the voting rule. Now, if a majority
(two or more) of your group votes Red, then the group decision is Red. Otherwise,
your group decision is Blue. That is, your group's decision will be whichever color
receives more votes.
B Recall that in the previous session, your group decision was Red if two or more
members of your group voted Red. Otherwise your group decision was Blue. In
this session there will be a slight change in the voting rule. Now, if (and only if)
everyone in your group votes Red, your group decision is Red. Otherwise, your
group decision is Blue. That is, if anyone in your group votes Blue, the group
decision is Blue.
Are there any questions?
RULES FOR EXPERIMENT SESSION #3
This experiment session will also last for 15 matches. The rules are the same as
experiment session #2, with one exception. In this experiment, each group will conduct
one preliminary vote before making the nal vote. In the preliminary vote, you may
vote for either the Red Jar or the Blue Jar. You do not receive any earnings for the
preliminary vote. The number of Blue and Red votes in the preliminary vote will be
revealed to you and the other members of your group. After you have been told this
preliminary vote outcome, your group will conduct the nal vote, in the same manner
as in experiment session #2. We will conduct a practice session to illustrate how the
preliminary vote is conducted.
Are there any questions?
RULES FOR EXPERIMENT SESSION #4
This experiment session will also last for 15 matches. The rules are the same as
experiment session #1, with one exception. As in the previous experiment, each group
will conduct one preliminary vote before making the nal vote. You do not receive any
earnings for the preliminary vote. The outcome of this preliminary vote will be revealed
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to you and the other members of your group, including the exact number of red votes and
blue votes. You are not paid anything for this outcome. You must record this information
on your information and record sheet. Then your group will conduct the nal vote, in
the same manner as experiment session #1. That is,
[READ A OR B]
A Unanimity instructions: If (and only if) everyone in your group votes Red, your
group decision is Red. Otherwise, your group decision is Blue. That is, if anyone
in your group votes Blue, the group decision is Blue.
B Majority rule instructions: If a majority (two or more) of your group votes Red,
then the group decision is Red. Otherwise, your group decision is Blue. That is,
your group's decision will be whichever color receives more votes.
Are there any questions?
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7 Appendix 2: Solution for the case: N = 3, unanim-
ity, with straw poll
7.1 Notation and strategies
Denote by:
 s = fG; Ig the signal (either guilty or innocent);
 p = the probability of receiving the correct signal;
 v
t
= fC
t
; A
t
g the vote (either convict or acquit) in the straw poll (t = 0) and in
the decisive nal vote (t = 1);
 i = f0; 1; 2g the number of other convicting votes in the straw poll;
 j = f0; 1; 2g the number of other matching signals.
Payos are dened as follows:
 0 for making the right decision (that is, convicting a guilty defendant and acquitting
an innocent defendant);
 q for acquitting a guilty defendant (where q 2 [0; 1]);
 q   1 for convicting an innocent.
Each agent's strategy consists of a pair of probabilities 
0
; 
1
, specifying the prob-
ability to vote to convict in the straw poll (as a function of one own's signal) and the
probability to vote to convict in the nal vote (as a function of one own's signal, one
own's vote in the straw poll, others' vote in the straw poll):

0
(s) =
e
EU
SP
(C
0
;s)
e
EU
SP
(C
0
;s)
+ e
EU
SP
(A
0
;s)
(3)

1
(s; v
0
; i) =
e
EU
FV
(C
1
;s;v
0
;i)
e
EU
FV
(C
1
;s;v
0
;i)
+ e
EU
FV
(A
1
;s;v
0
;i)
(4)
where EU
SP
(EU
FV
) is the expected utility for casting a given vote in the straw poll
(nal vote, respectively).
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7.2 Expected utility for the straw poll
EU
SP
(v
0
; s) =
(
P
2
j=0
P
2
i=0
(j)(i; j)EU
FIN
(G; v
0
; i) if s = G
P
2
j=0
P
2
i=0
(j)(i; 2  j)EU
FIN
(I; v
0
; i) if s = I
where (j) is the (conditional) probability of other j matching signals:
(j) =
8
>
<
>
:
p
3
+ (1  p)
3
if j = 2
2[p
2
(1  p) + p(1  p)
2
] if j = 1
p(1  p)
2
+ p
2
(1  p) if j = 0
that is, in a more compact form,
(j) = (2  jj   1j)[p
j+1
(1  p)
2 j
+ p
2 j
(1  p)
j+1
];
(i; j) is the (conditional) probability that i other jurors voted to convict in the straw
poll when the number of their matching signals is j:
(i; j) =
8
>
<
>
:
[
0
(G)]
j
[
0
(I)]
2 j
if i = 2
j
0
(G) + (2  j)
0
(I)  2[
0
(G)]
j
[
0
(I)]
2 j
if i = 1
(1  
0
(G))
j
[1  
0
(I)]
2 j
if i = 0
and EU
FIN
is the weighted combination of the expected utilities from voting either to
convict or acquit in the nal vote, where weights are given by the strategy for the nal
vote:
EU
FIN
(s; v
0
; i) = 
1
(s; v
0
; i)EU
FV
(C
1
; s; v
0
; i) + [1  
1
(s; v
0
; i)]EU
FV
(A
1
; s; v
0
; i):
7.3 Expected utility for the nal vote
In order to make the analysis clearer, consider rst the case of a guilty signal (so for now,
s = G). By the end of the straw poll, every juror can observe all the votes (so that he
knows j), but still does not know what the true state is (either guilty or innocent) and
what signals the other jurors received (where the number of other guilty signal can be
either 0, 1 or 2). This leads to 2  3 = 6 informations sets. The conditional probability of
being in any of these sets is given by:
^
(i; k) =
(i; k)
P
6
l=1
(i; l)
where
(i; k) =
(
(2  jk   2j)p
4 k
(1  p)
k 1
(i; 3  k) if k = 1; 2; 3
(2  jk   2j)p
k 1
(1  p)
4 k
(i; 3  k) if k = 4; 5; 6.
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For an intuition about these coeÆcients, notice that we ordered the information sets
so that the defendant is guilty in the rst three of them ( k = 1; 2; 3); and innocent
otherwise. So
^
(i; k) are the conditional probabilities for the signal being correct (as in
this case we are taking s = G) for k = 1; 2; 3; and incorrect otherwise.
For the case of s = I we can dene similar coeÆcients:
^(i; k) =
(i; k)
P
6
l=1
(i; l)
where
(i; k) =
(
(2  jk   2j)p
4 k
(1  p)
k 1
(i; k   1) if k = 1; 2; 3
(2  jk   2j)p
k 1
(1  p)
4 k
(i; k   1) if k = 4; 5; 6.
Notice rst that the unanimity rule in the nal vote implies that, whenever a ju-
ror votes to acquit, then independently of what the other jurors voted, the payos are
determined (0 if the trues state is innocent, q   1 otherwise). So:
EU
FV
(A
1
; s; v
0
; i) =
(
(q   1)
P
3
k=1
^
(i; k) if s = G
(q   1)
P
3
k=1
^(i; k + 3) if s = I.
The formulas for EU
FV
when the nal vote is to convict are more complicated. So
consider rst the case in which the juror received a guilty signal and voted to convict in
the straw poll:
EU
FV
(C
1
; G; C
0
; i) = (q   1)
3
X
k=1
^
(i; k)[1  (i; k)]  q
3
X
k=1
^
(i; k + 3)[(i; k)]
To understand this formula, notice that the nal payo is 0 only if the true state
is guilty and everyone is voting to convict. The payo is q   1 (as shown in the rst
addend) if the true state is guilty (so that the sum is over k = 1; 2; 3) but someone voted
to acquit (with probability as expressed in 1   ). The second addend represents the
other case, when the true state is innocent but everyone voted to convict. The s are
dened as follows:
(i; k) =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
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1
(G;A
0
; 1)
3 k
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] if i = 1

1
(G;C
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; 2)
3 k

1
(I; C
0
; 2)
k 1
if i = 2
where x = 1:5  jk   1:5j and w = 1:5  jk   2:5j.
The case for a guilty signal and a straw poll vote to acquit (EU
FV
(C
1
; G; A
0
; i)) is
similar, but for the fact that everyone else observes one vote to convict less than in the
previous case. So the formulas are as above, but for subtracting an observed convicting
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vote in the 's (as an example, 
1
(G;C
0
; 1) becomes 
1
(G;C
0
; 0)).
The case for an innocent signal is similar, but for the fact that it involves the ^
coeÆcients and the exponents in the formulas are switched. More precisely, consider the
case of a straw poll vote to convict:
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3
X
k=1
^(i; k + 3)[1  (i; k)]  q
3
X
k=1
^(i; k)[(i; k)]
where
(i; k) =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
:

1
(G;A
0
; 1)
k 1

1
(I; A
0
; 1)
3 k
if i = 0
1
2
[
1
(G;C
0
; 1)
w

1
(I; C
0
; 1)
1 w

1
(G;A
0
; 2)
1 x

1
(I; A
0
; 2)
x
+

1
(G;C
0
; 1)
1 x

1
(I; C
0
; 1)
x

1
(G;A
0
; 2)
w

1
(I; A
0
; 2)
1 w
] if i = 1

1
(G;C
0
; 2)
k 1

1
(I; C
0
; 2)
3 k
if i = 2
Using the above analysis, we constructed a numerical algorithm to compute the Logit
QRE correspondence.
Figures X and XX show the Logit equilibrium correspondence for the 3-person Una-
nimity and Majority Rule jury treatments with a straw poll, respectively. The curves
labeled I and G graph the Logit equilibrium probability of voting to convict in the rst
(straw) voting stage, depending on whether an innocent or guilty signal was received, re-
spectively. The other curves show the Logit equilibrium probabilities of voting to convict
in the second (nal) stage as a function of the signal received (i or g), one's own vote
in the straw poll (C or A) and the number of conviction votes in the straw poll by the
other jurors (0; 1; or 2).
Several points about these gures are notable. First, the equilibrium correspondence
involves two bifurcations. For small values of , there is a unique equilibrium. At
a critical point of approximately  = xx:xx we pick up several new equilibria, which
branch o simultaneously. The original part of the correspondence continues smoothly
and eventually converges to the mixing probabilities of the babbling equilibria. That
is, player's vote uninformatively in the straw vote and in the nal vote they play the
symmetric equilibrium of the game as if not straw vote had taken place. The new
equilibria that branch o correspond to informative equilibria, with one of these branches
converging to the full communication equilibrium, in which voters vote informatively in
the straw poll, and, in the nal vote, vote according to the majority outcome in the straw
poll.
We focus our attention on the branch converging to the full communication equi-
librium. There are two reasons for doing this. First, it seems like the most sensible
equilibrium in the game with a straw poll, and is the one that Coughlan (1998) empha-
sizes. Second, when we t QRE to the data, we nd that this is the equilibrium closest
to the data.
The key feature to observe in the QRE graph is the fact that voters will condition on
their signal as well as the outcome of the straw poll, in contrast to the full communication
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equilibrium. Moreover, this conditioning follows a very logical pattern. For any combi-
nation of how the other jurors vote in the straw poll, the QRE predicts that a voter is
more likely to vote to acquit if they received an innocent signal than if they had received
a guilty signal. For example, consider the QRE at our estimated value of  = 38:42 (see
table). If both other jurors voted to acquit in the straw poll, a voter with an innocent
signal is predicted to vote to acquit approximately 75predicted to vote to acquit slightly
less than half the time. Similar comparisons hold for the cases where one other voter
voted to acquit in the straw poll and where neither other voter voted to acquit. These
qualitative comparisons are all borne out in the data.
While the QRE picks up the qualitative features of conditional voting in the second
stage, it does not provide a very good t quantitatively. In fact, the NNM estimates
provide a better t to the data than the QRE, even though NNM does not make the
right qualitative predictions. The estimated choice probabilities from the QRE model is
superimposed on the gures.
The reason why the quantitative t of QRE is not as tight as the NNM t is not
entirely clear. QRE predictions of choice probabilities vary substantially across informa-
tion sets. For some of these information sets, the QRE choice probabilities converge to
0 or 1 very quickly (especially in the second stage), while others converge very slowly
(especially in the rst stage). However, the data in the rst stage has less noise than the
data in the second stage! Therefore, we can't get a good t both the rst stage and to
the second stage with a single value of .
There is a second possible explanation for this. In the QRE, the frequency of voting
informatively should be much higher with a guilty signal than with an innocent signal.
This reects the fact that voters who receive innocent signals are less likely to be pivotal
in the second stage, so that their vote in the rst stage is less likely to make a dierence.
Consequently, the QRE choice probabilities conditional on an innocent signal converge
to the informative Nash equilibrium more slowly than the QRE choice probabilities con-
ditional on a guilty signal. The data do indeed support this qualitative prediction, but
the dierence is not statistically signicant (.067 for innocent signals and .046 for guilty
signals).
Given this post hoc analysis, there would be several xes that to improve the QRE t,
such as estimating a separate value for  in the rst and second stages, for for dierent
signals, but these xes are ad hoc and we have not pursued them.
15
15
A second, more interesting alternative is to estimate a version of QRE that incorporates a second
"tremble" term, similar to NNM, but which (unlike NNM) is accounted for in the computation of
equilibrium. This would eectively bound the QRE a xed distance from 0) and 1. We have not
pursued this due to issues of computational feasibility.
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Table 1: Solution Values Without a Straw Poll When p = :7
Majority Unanimity
n (g) (i) Pr[CjI] Pr[AjG] (g) (i) Pr[CjI] Pr[AjG]
3 1.0000 0.0000 .2160 .2160 1.0000 0.3143 .1404 .4989
6 1.0000 0.0000 .0705 .2557 1.0000 0.6511 .1863 .4849
12 1.0000 0.0000 .0386 .1178 1.0000 0.8244 .2073 .4776
24 1.0000 0.0000 .0115 .0314 1.0000 0.9120 .2173 .4740
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Table 2. First and Second Treatments by Experimental Session
Experiment Number of Group Session
Number Subjects Size 1 2 3 4
CJ1 12 3 U/N (15) M/N (10) M/Y (10) U/Y (10)
CJ2 12 3 M/N (15) U/N (15) U/Y (15) M/Y (15)
CJ3 12 6 U/N (15) M/N (15) M/Y (15) U/Y (15)
CJ4 12 6 M/N (15) U/N (15) U/Y (15) M/Y (15)
Note: U = Unanimity rule, M = Majority Rule, N = No Straw Poll, Y = Straw Poll
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Table 3: Proportion Voting to Convict by Signal
and Voting Rule, Controlling for Straw Poll
Without Straw Poll With Straw Poll
Blue Red Blue Red
Rule n (Innocent) (Guilty) (Innocent) (Guilty)
Majority 3 .057 (157) .972 (143) .205 (146) .838 (154)
6 .209 (172) .979 (188) .248 (202) .835 (158)
Unanimity 3 .360 (186) .954 (174) .161 (149) .834 (151)
6 .478 (186) .897 (174) .372 (183) .864 (177)
Note: Number of observations in parentheses
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Table 4: QRE, NNM, and Naive Model Estimates of 3- and 6-Person Groups
Three-Person Six-Person
f
i
Nash QRE NNM Naive f
i
Nash QRE NNM Naive
Majority (g) .972 1.000 0.964 0.964 0.964 .979 1.000 0.960 0.889 0.889
(i) .057 0.000 0.036 0.036 0.036 .209 0.000 0.158 0.111 0.111
j 19.016 0.928 0.928 23.204 0.778 0.778

lo
j
lo
14.536 0.856 0.856 19.016 0.708 0.708

hi
j
hi
21.642 0.953 0.953 29.757 0.837 0.837
 L

53.738 53.738 53.738 110.201 125.580 125.580
Unanimity (g) .954 1.000 0.958 0.952 0.792 .897 1.000 0.887 0.878 0.704
(i) .360 0.314 0.407 0.332 0.209 .478 0.651 0.535 0.614 0.297
jj 9.197 0.903 0.583 12.041 0.755 0.407

lo
j
lo
j 7.689 0.827 0.496 11.921 0.643 0.311

hi
j
hi
j 10.893 0.954 0.662 12.530 0.845 0.498
 L

154.897 154.350 184.227 188.016 194.057 219.409
Note: See Table 3 for number of observations.
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Table 5: Voting with a Straw Poll:
Proportion Voting to Convict by Prior Information
(Straw Vote by Signal, and Final Vote by Straw Poll Result
Straw Vote Final Vote
Blue Red Blue Tie Red
Rule n (Innocent) (Guilty) (Innocent) (Guilty)
Majority 3 .103 (146) .968 (154) .111 (144) | .917 (156)
6 .089 (202) .994 (158) .135 (156) 0.606 (66) .877 (138)
Unanimity 3 .067 (149) .954 (151) .160 (156) | .868 (144)
6 .049 (183) .989 (177) .167 (120) .657 (102) .971 (138)
Note: Number of observations in parentheses
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Table 6: Probit Analysis of Final Vote in Groups with Straw Poll,
by Voting Rule and Group Size
Decision Rule
Majority Unanimous
Variable n = 3 n = 6 n = 3 n = 6
Constant -1.891 -2.213 -1.799 -2.039
(-9.468) (-10.080) (-9.363) (-9.285)
Public information 1.016 0.618 0.810 0.723
(Straw Poll) (7.355) (8.540) (6.407) (9.296)
Private sSignal 0.874 1.154 1.136 0.751
(4.068) (6.487) (5.276) (4.037)
Number of observations 300 360 300 360
Log likelihood -109.82 -138.46 -110.26 -130.13
% correctly predicted 89.0 82.2 83.7 84.17
Note: t statistics in parentheses.
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Table 7: Jury Decision vs True State: Proportion Incorrect Decisions
by True State, Group Size, and Voting Rule
Without Straw Poll With Straw Poll
True State True State
Innocent Guilty Innocent Guilty
Rule n Data Nash QRE Data Nash QRE Data Nash Data Nash
Major 3 .175 (40) .216 .234 .300 (60) .216 .234 .226 (53) .216 .191 (47) .216
6 .296 (27) .071 .177 .212 (33) .256 .221 .176 (34) .071 .115 (26) .256
Unan 3 .190 (63) .140 .187 .526 (57) .499 .502 .140 (50) .216 .360 (50) .216
6 .029 (34) .186 .069 .731 (26) .485 .772 .107 (28) .071 .437 (32) .256
Note: Number of observations in parentheses.
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Table 8: Breakdown of Juror Types in Unanimous Juries without Deliberation
(Innocent Signals Only)
Juror Type Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Total
1: Sincere 4 (0/31) 4 (0/35) 3 (0/27) 0 (0/0) 12 (93/93)
2: Mixers 7(24/57) 5 (20/40) 6 (19/41) 10 (32/75) 27 (95/213)
3: Punitive 1 (5/5) 3 (18/18) 3 (23/23) 2 (15/15) 9 (61/61)
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Table A-1: Model Estimates for 3-Person Juries with Straw vote
n f
i
QRE NNM Nash
Unanimity (g) 151 .954 .882 .904 1.000
(i) 149 .067 .293 .096 0.000
(gC0) 31 .419 .574 .096 0.000
(gC1) 47 1.000 0.995 0.904 1.000
(gC2) 66 .955 1.000 0.904 1.000
(gA0) 2 1.000 0.501 0.096 0.000
(gA1) 2 .500 0.895 0.904 1.000
(gA2) 3 0.000 1.000 0.904 1.000
(iC0) 4 .250 0.093 0.096 0.000
(iC1) 3 0.000 0.099 0.096 0.000
(iC2) 3 0.000 0.751 0.904 1.000
(iA0) 49 .061 0.259 0.096 0.000
(iA1) 68 .074 0.378 0.096 0.000
(iA2) 22 .682 0.978 0.904 1.000
j 38.42 0.807

lo
j
lo
37.28 0.756

hi
j
hi
40.00 .850
 L

279.63 190.62
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Figure 1: Symmetric Part of QRE Correspondence under Majority Rule
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Figure 2: Symmetric Part of QRE Correspondence under Unanimity
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Figure 3: QRE Correspondence for 3 Person Unanimity Jury
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Figure 4: Symmetric part of QRE Correspondence for 6 Person Unanimity Jury
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